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Compound Voids and Unproductive Entrepreneurship: The Rise of English Fever in China  
  
Abstract: China has emerged as an economic power due, in part, to government policies that 
opened China to the world and created a modern consumer culture. One of these policies is the 
advancement of English education, including private providers, which has spawned the 
phenomenon of “English Fever”.  We use the unique context of the private English education 
industry in China to illustrate the concept of “compound (institutional) voids” and their 
relationship to unproductive entrepreneurship.  Our contribution is to untangle some of the 
complexity relating to institutional relationships and describe how compound voids increase the 
likelihood of rent-seeking behavior.    
  
Keywords: Institutions, regulation, social trust, compound void, unproductive 
entrepreneurship, China, development, educational policy, English Fever  
  





China must catch up with the most advanced countries in the world. But how shall we go about 
it? I believe we have to begin by tackling science and education – Deng Xiaoping August 8, 1977   
(China Internet Information Center 2014)  
  
Introduction   
All of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “PRC” or “China”), especially urban 
centers like Shanghai, experienced massive growth and development over the past thirty years. 
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Shanghai’s total GDP grew to 1.92 trillion RMB in 2011, almost four times what it was just ten 
years earlier (Shanghai Statistics Bureau 2010), tripling per capita GDP and leading to a sharp 
increase in disposable income. The growth is creating a new Chinese dream: a high-income job, 
a well-furnished home, a car or two, financial security, and an outstanding education for their 
children (Adamson 2002). For many, the key to make the dream a reality is English fluency — 
believed to be ‘the’ antecedent to improving one’s skills and finding a good job (Chang 2008; 
Clavel 2014; Hessler 2010).                    
China’s government has touted English as a means to help the nation advance, arguing 
that its mastery is critical to becoming an international competitor (Adamson 2002; Hu 2002a). 
Consequently, the government as an institution developed English educational polices to build  
“systems of established and prevalent social rules to structure social interactions” (Hodgson 
2006, 2) in order to open China to the world and create a modern consumer culture. As demand 
for English flourished, it was elevated beyond a language and into an ideology. Today, China has 
the largest number of English learners in the world (People’s Daily 2002). Government policy 
fueled the rise of “English Fever” into an industry worth $7.5 billion (46.3 billion RMB), 
representing more than 50,000 international and domestically owned language centers 
(Murphy 2013). Like many industries coming of age in the wake of China’s market reforms, 
English education is evolving as it copes with shifting regulations and fickle consumers.  
  As China rejoined the world in the 1980s, English became a mandatory course for all 
middle school, high school, and university students and remains so today; English exams must 
be passed for promotion to the next grade. These exams are embedded throughout the 
educational system and act as social gate-keeping devices (Clavel 2014; Wang 2007; Cheng 
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2008). The mandatory exams reinforce English as a symbolic key for success and a valorized 
form of cultural capital with exchange value. Learning English in China as a second language is a 
complex task (Norton and Wu 2001), and governmental regulation could not develop quickly 
enough to meet the burgeoning demands for English education in a new marketplace (Hu 
2002b; Qin 1999). Additionally, the opening of China resulted in a new emphasis on 
materialism, with possible demotion of collective norms such as social trust.  
English Fever created an environment for entrepreneurial private language schools to 
develop and thrive while also cultivating false advertising, poor business practices and cynicism 
(Chen 2012). Despite reforms, the training of English teachers has not kept pace with demand in 
quantity and in quality (Hu 2002b; Norton and Wu 2001). A lack of qualified English teachers 
combined with large class sizes is a severe constraint; many students still struggle with their 
language skills (Cheng and Wang 2004; Hu 2002b). After graduation, students, even those 
trained to teach English (Hu 2002b), seek additional sources to improve their English with the 
hope of one day fulfilling the promise of a better life, the new Chinese dream. Schools were 
able to promise anything, and were not held accountable (Kwong 1997). Students found 
unqualified teachers, and false promises of curriculum that did not deliver. Dissatisfaction grew; 
however, the answer of how to improve the system to meet students’ needs while still 
maintaining profits and market share remains unanswered (Hu 2002b, 2008, 2009; Wu 2001). 
The educational inequalities in China have made English a service for those who can pay (Clavel 
2014). Similar to the financial reforms in China (Liang 2009), these educational policies resulted 
in an unequal distribution of wealth and processes fostering inequality of English education. 
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Despite being cheated by false marketing and other unethical practices, Chinese consumers are 
still seeking to gain social status by learning English.  
  The aim of this article is to illustrate how deficiencies in legal systems, particularly the 
regulatory function, accompanied by the deterioration of values such as social trust, which 
could compensate for gaps in formal legal institutions, give rise to a predatory environment 
fostering destructive entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990) at worst and unproductive 
entrepreneurship at best.  The private English industry in the People’s Republic of China 
exemplifies how bamboozling and rent-seeking undermine what should be a benefit to 
individual purveyors, consumers, and society as a whole: the expansion of the education 
system.  Building upon the work of North (1990) and Khanna and Palepu (2010), we advance 
the idea of compound voids: the localized failure of both the initial institution and a 
compensating institution geared towards a specific purpose (e.g. contracting between parties) 
necessary for markets to function well.  We begin with a review of the pertinent institutional 
economics literature to develop the ideas of compound voids and unproductive 
entrepreneurship.  We then discuss the context of the private English industry in China and how 
it illustrates the consequences of compound voids.  We close with some thoughts about how 
this particular scenario came into being along with limitations of our work and suggestions for 
future research.   
Institutions and Entrepreneurship  
Legal institutions and entrepreneurship  
Current and prior academic literature underscore the importance of functioning 
institutions for entrepreneurship and economic development (Baumol, Litan and Schramm  
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2007; Gimmon and Levie 2009; Klein 1988; McDaniel 2003, 2005; Minniti and Levesque 2010; 
Parris and McInnis-Bowers 2014; Warnecke 2013).  In recent years particular focus has been 
paid to these topics in the context of emerging markets, especially China (Kim and Li 2014; Luo 
Sun and Wang 2011; Schweinberger 2014).  It is understood that emerging markets differ from 
mature economies, particularly with regard to the institutional environment (Khanna and 
Palepu 2010; Peng 2003).   An entrepreneur for the purposes of this paper encompass ‘one who 
owns, launches, manages, and assumes the risks of an economic venture’ (Greve and Salaff 
2003, 3).     
Institutions are commonly defined as the “rules of the game” (North 1990, 3) by which 
society organizes itself.  At a basic level, institutions are important for business in general and 
entrepreneurship in particular because they reduce expropriation of rents by other actors in an 
economy (Baumol 1990; Casson 1995; Hodgson 2006; North 1990).  Such institutions can be 
either formal (codified in law) or informal (articulated as the norms, values, and attitudes of a 
society) (North 1990).  Note that North and subsequent institutional economists explain the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions as a complex, reinforcing, and dynamic 
skein of rules governing human interaction that evolves; there is no simple dichotomy between 
the two types.  
Because of the role of institutions in preventing expropriation of rents, scholars have 
paid much attention to the workings of legal systems and their impact on entrepreneurial 
activity (cf. Kim and Li 2014; Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz 2012; Levie and Autio 2011; Troilo 
2011).  Legal systems encompass separate but related institutions such as property rights, rule 
of law, enforcement of contracts, and regulation (Aidis et al. 2012; Estrin, Korosteleva and 
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Mickiewicz 2009; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002; Levie and Autio 2011; Troilo 2011; 
Weingast 1995).  One useful distinction for the purposes of this paper is vertical expropriation 
of rents versus horizontal expropriation of rents (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), and the 
institutions designed to prevent them.  The state can expropriate rents vertically via taxation, 
fines, and outright seizure of assets; strong property rights are the antidote (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2005; Weingast 1995).  Horizontal expropriation occurs via “peer” actors in the 
economy; strong rule of law (“contracting institutions”, in the words of Acemoglu and Johnson) 
and regulation are the remedies (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib 
and Perlitz 2010; Troilo 2011).     
 The focus here is horizontal expropriation and the role of regulation as the primary 
deterrent to private English schools bamboozling their customers/pupils.   It has been noted in 
other scholarship that regulatory burden can be a severe impediment to entrepreneurial 
activity. (cf. Djankov, LaPorta, Lopes-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2002; Demirguc-Kunt, Love and 
Maksimovic 2006; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan 2006).  Here it is the lack of regulation that is a 
concern, not its excess.  We are treating the deleterious effects on consumers in particular and 
society in general when the regulatory function is weak, as this is less studied compared to the 
phenomenon of excessive regulation and its impact on firms and entrepreneurs. 
Social trust and entrepreneurship  
Trust is a function of economic transactions embedded in social relationships  
(Granovetter 1985).  It can be defined as “the subjective probability with which an agent 
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular beneficial action” 
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(James 2002, 292).  Trust implies vulnerability; “situations in which the risk one takes depends 
on the performance of another actor” (Coleman 1990, 91).  To trust someone is to rely on 
his/her good faith, while to be trustworthy is to exhibit good faith when others rely on you 
(James 2002).      
Two components comprise the act of trusting: the belief in the trustworthiness of other 
people and the specific preferences of the one who trusts (Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and Zingales 
2013).  These preferences include risk aversion (Karlan 2005), reciprocity (Cox 2004), and 
altruism (Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov 2006).  The first component of trust is the focus of this 
paper.  This belief in the trustworthiness of others might be considered an entrepreneurial 
attitude such as self-efficacy or confidence (Trevelyan 2009), but it is the macro-environment in 
which new firm formation occurs as opposed to the micro-level cognitive processes behind 
trust that concern this study.  Trust as a societal belief in the honesty of other actors, i.e. trust 
as social capital (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1995; Fukuyama1995; April 2008) is critical to 
entrepreneurship and our story.  
Cooperation among economic actors is difficult to sustain when there is a finite game, 
when there are a large number of players, and when information about the other players is 
lacking (North 1990).  The complexities of interaction in these circumstances give rise to 
opportunistic behaviour, which increases the costs of transactions.  Institutions such as trust 
can operate as constraints on such behaviour and consequently lower transaction costs 
(Coase1960; Williamson 1985; Jaffe, Carciente and Zanoni 2007).  They can function as 
intermediaries between the entrepreneur and the sources of inputs (Casson 1995).  From the 
entrepreneur’s point of view institutions such as trust serve to decrease the likelihood of 
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expropriation of rents from their labour and ingenuity (McMillan and Woodruff 2002), 
particularly when formal institutions such as rule of law are lacking (Kim and Li 2014; Troilo 
2011; 2010).  
Compound voids and unproductive entrepreneurship  
  In describing why emerging markets are emerging, Khanna and Palepu (2010) coined the 
term “institutional void”.  Where markets lack the needed institutions to bring buyers and 
sellers together in an efficient manner, a void exists (Khanna and Palepu 2010).  Consonant with 
the literature above, which these authors were also accessing, these voids raise transaction 
costs and if severe enough can cause markets to collapse entirely.  
  We draw attention now to the relationship among formal institutions, informal 
institutions, and entrepreneurial activity with respect to expropriation of rents.  Baumol (1990) 
famously posited that the “rules of the game” could incentivize various kinds of 
entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive, and destructive.  He associates the first with the 
introduction of new products/services and economic growth via recombination of inputs 
(Schumpeter 1934) and the second with rent-seeking; curiously, he doesn’t clearly delineate 
between the second and third types (Sauka 2008).  Both unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship can involve rentseeking, illegal activities such as the drug trade and 
smuggling, and licit activity that occurs in the shadow economy; furthermore, firms can engage 
in various types of entrepreneurial activity simultaneously (Baumol 1990; Sauka 2008).  
  As discussed above, institutions tend to be mutually reinforcing meta-systems governing 
human behaviour (Hodgson 2006; North 1990).  As economies develop, norms such as trust 
become codified in regulations and contract law; these laws don’t supersede trust so much as 
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add another layer of protection against expropriation of rents.  In the emerging market context, 
the relative lack of protection offered by contract law and/or regulations can be compensated 
by a relatively high level of social trust (Kim and Li 2014; Troilo 2011; 2010)  
  It seems trivial to say that a lightly regulated or unregulated industry such as private 
English academies in an emerging market such as China will give rise to predatory behaviour 
such as swindling the students.  If we examine the situation more closely, however, we find 
there is more than just the failure of the government to regulate or enforce contracts between 
schools and students; there is also a breakdown in social trust allowing shady English schools to 
thrive and thereby encouraging new entry into this realm of unproductive entrepreneurship.  
We advance two propositions for consideration:  
Proposition 1: Compound voids are institutional voids characterized by the failure of two similar 
institutions to reinforce each other and the market in a localized instance.  
Proposition 2: While the presence of unproductive entrepreneurship may be due to an 
institutional void, it is more likely the result of compound voids given the lack of reinforcement 
inherent in this concept.  
  Let us examine these two propositions in turn.  The first involves what we might term a 
“primary institution” and a “secondary institution” with regard to protection against horizontal 
expropriation of rents, i.e. regulation/contract law and social trust.  This is what we mean by 
“similar”; the function/purpose of the two institutions is shared.  We may imagine that in most 
circumstances the “primary institutions” are formal in nature whereas the “secondary 
institutions” are informal, but this characterization, while generally true, need not be absolute.  
The presence of the initial void, lack of regulation/contract law, could be compensated if social 
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trust is relatively high.  Purveyors of English schools would recognize that, although the 
government may not be doing an adequate job of monitoring their activities, they would be 
foolish to violate the norm of trust bonding them to their pupils.  This is not the case, so there is 
no effective protection for consumers of English. Lack of mutual reinforcement undermines the 
market for this service.    
The phrase “in a localized instance” merits explanation.  Its use demarcates the 
intellectual space we are identifying in our study of institutions.  We are not speaking here of a 
failed state, or even a dysfunctional one, where the failure of institutions is pervasive.  China is 
far from this condition; indeed its meteoric growth is often hailed as testimony to wise and 
gradual institutional change in contrast to Iraq or Russia where such change seemingly 
happened overnight.  The “localized” nature of the compound void could be geographic or 
industry-specific or both; it impacts a given market but not the entire national economy.  
  The second proposition flows from the first.  The presence of an institutional void need 
not be devastating, though as Khanna and Palepu (2010) note, such voids do present 
operational challenges.  If social trust is present as it should be, the temptation towards 
unproductive entrepreneurship is less because English providers recognize that there are 
reputational and real operating costs from violating this norm.  Not only do compound voids 
expose customers to bamboozlement, they also encourage shady characters to enter and open 
their own “English schools” to victimize the naïve.  It is a matter of degree.  There is no doubt 
that some unproductive behaviour would occur in the absence of regulation/contract law, but 
the compound void exacerbates this tendency greatly.  
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English Fever and the Emergence of the Private School Industry in China 1987-2012  
Governmental policies to open China’s economy and culture to the world created 
business markets fostering a culture where English became a symbol of success—the path to 
the newly formed middle class (Yajun 2003). Over the last 25 years the effects of these policies 
led to dramatic changes in society, educational development, and the rise of the private 
education industry. English Fever created an opportunity for entrepreneurs to start private 
English schools. As China’s rise began and people’s lives improved, demand grew for products 
and the creation of new economic opportunities that could help a child perform better in 
school, especially in English. Over time the private English education market has moved from 
mass consumption models to a test-taking emphasis and then to Western pedagogical methods 
for learning oral English by Chinese providers, and finally to international entry.   
The Mass Consumption of English   
One of the first influential entrepreneurs of the private education market was Li Yang 
(Yajun 2003). He embodies the market entrepreneur defined by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1943) 
who creatively innovated through a process of questioning the status quo of existing products 
and services. Like many Chinese, Li struggled with English and was shy and nervous about the 
oral component of the College English Test (CET-4). In 1987, as a frustrated student studying 
English, he suddenly yelled out the words and discovered he could speak the lines more clearly. 
Li started Crazy English that ‘taught’ English through yelling. The demand for English fueled the 
success of Li’s mass consumption product where he would yell English together with thousands 
of English learners filling stadiums throughout China. Before long he had books, tapes, TV 
shows, and even a film (Yajun 2003).   
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Crazy English was the bridge from the older Communist system to the birth of a more 
market-based and utilitarian English private school industry. Li responded to the insecurity and 
desperation of consumers to create an empire of products. His method of uniform yelling 
(chanting) satisfied consumers’ psychological needs by helping them to feel confident about 
English, the new culture, and China’s new place in the world. As consumers realized he did not 
actually teach English the cult of Crazy English began to fade; however, today it remains 
profitable.   
The Test Takers  
Another first mover in the private education sector is the New Oriental School. It was 
founded in 1993, and is now the largest private English school in China traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange (Osnos 2008; Yajun 2003). Unlike Crazy English, the school focuses on helping 
students pass the exams that determine their futures. The teaching delivers test-taking 
strategies, exam analysis, and strategic memorization to pass international tests like the TOEFL, 
ISLETS, and the GRE as well as local exams like CET4, CET6, and simultaneous translation. Due to 
the importance of the exams, thousands of imitators popped up across the nation to teach test-
taking skills.  Before long, university, high school, and even middle school teachers began 
starting private schools for their students to take additional classes in the evenings and 
weekends. Teachers of schools with a good record for English-language learning (i.e., valued 
brands) started private schools using the school’s name and classrooms. They adopted test-
taking strategies from the New Oriental School and added reviews connected to public schools’ 
curricula. These ventures allowed teachers to make larger salaries, and the owners to become 
wealthy. Today, test-taking schools are offered throughout almost all levels of education.   
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  In addition, there is another market of test-taking schools targeting adults who are no 
longer in school as well as university students seeking to go overseas. They take classes to pass 
the GRE, TOEFL, IELTS, and GMAT. These companies also have expanded their product offerings 
to include exam preparation for adult exams offered in the workplace, such as simultaneous 
translation exams for career translators and English exams for workers aspiring to the 
hospitality industry. These schools sell textbooks, workbooks, and a variety of other print 
materials. Given the emphasis on rote memorization throughout China’s educational system, 
these schools have been popular; however, the lack of practical oral English instruction in these 
centers is a continuing weakness.   
The Promise of Western Methods to Improve Oral English Skills   
Throughout the last decade the lack of regulation for training centers in China enabled 
schools the ability to promise anything without being held accountable and “US education 
becomes a selling point and an incentive to lie!” (Gao 2013).  Students found foreign teachers 
who were unqualified, and false promises of ‘new and quick learning’ curriculum that did not 
deliver.  A teacher of TOEFL writing emphasized how “high score guaranteed is just recruiting 
strategy. As long as students are willing to register, the school will take all” (Li 2012). 
Dissatisfaction grew.  However, nobody knew how to improve the current system to meet 
students’ needs while still maintaining profits and market share. Students believed English was 
critical to their success and would keep trying, despite being cheated (Chen 2012).   
These observations are supported by ethnographic participant-observation by the first 
author, who taught English in China for 11 years and kept a reflective journal.  To provide 
credibility (internal validity), we used triangulation by analyzing multiple data sources. 
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Transferability (external validity) was achieved by developing a narrative description of the data 
by the first investigator keeping a reflective journal. In order to improve dependability 
(reliability) and conformability (objectivity), the second and third authors, who were not 
involved in data collection, served as auditors and reviewed all analyses and interpretations 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
By 2002, schools that claimed to use Western teaching methods, have smaller class 
sizes, and develop oral English skills began to open. Smaller classes sizes allowed schools to 
claim higher quality, as well as, charge higher prices. See Figure 1 2002 Shanghai English Center 
Tuition & Class Size based on marketing research conducted by the first author.  
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Advertising foreign teachers and smaller class sizes was a successful marketing method 
and also enabled schools to charger a higher price; however, the schools could not find teachers 
that could use these new interactive methods. The shortage of teachers, along with consumers’ 
lack of knowledge of these new methods or understanding what type of program would satisfy 
their needs, resulted in this niche market being one of the most fluid and broad parts of the 
private education system. For example, some schools, such as ONLY in Shanghai, adapted the 
teaching methods of public schools and decreased class sizes to do more oral exercises in class. 
They created oral textbooks that focus on speaking and listening; nevertheless, they still taught 
in the traditional manner – from the text. On the other side, some schools opened that were set 
up as social meeting places to discuss business, current events, or whatever else interested the 
students. No matter the school, one of the biggest draws was the chance to interact with 
foreign teachers.   
  Although universities recruited English teachers throughout the 1980s and 90s, the 














New Orient Kai En Web Wall Street
English Language Center Class 
Class Size Minimum Stated Class Size Maximum
17  
  
schools on campus, they began inviting foreign teachers to give talks and eventually teach in 
their schools. A valuable marketing tool for these schools was providing access to native 
speakers. Private schools offered much larger salaries to foreign teachers than the public 
schools. They could not meet demand, which sparked the growth of headhunting companies to 
bring Westerners to China. The quality and background of these foreign teachers varied with 
“some foreign teachers come from India or Malaysia. They have a strong accent - not standard 
British or America English.  Others are just foreign students from nearby universities without 
any training (Beijing Daily 2011). Many had little or no training as a teacher; however, the 
marketing benefit of having native speakers far outweighed the lack of teaching ability and 
became an essential selling point. Even though governmental approval was required to hire 
foreigners, schools often ignored this requirement. The promise of “foreign teachers is just a 
formula” and for most institutions “it’s all a fraud” (Beijing Daily 2011).  The schools promoting 
smaller class sizes and Western methods needed foreign teachers in their marketing materials 
to thrive.   
International Companies Enter the Market  
As foreign teachers spent time in China, they saw the potential for greater rewards by 
opening up their own schools. The market was booming and many joint-venture schools 
popped up overnight at the turn of the millennium. Some of these were small ventures in which 
the foreign teacher was freelancing while others became quite large. For instance, Kai En in 
Shanghai was started by an Irish foreign teacher who lived in Shanghai for years; it eventually 
grew into a school with more than 20 locations and hundreds of employees. In addition, 
international English training companies started selling franchises or setting up expatriate-led 
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ventures in China. The most famous of these, EF, already had a global presence. EF promised 
smaller class sizes and Western pedagogy. Their success spawned a franchise-based joint-
venture structure, but a number of the franchisees compromised the brand name by cutting 
corners on educational quality.   
By 2002, wholly owned foreign enterprises (WOFEs) like Wall Street and Web 
International moved into the market providing higher-end services to big-city elite. Wall Street 
fosters an upscale, professional image with all of its foreign teachers dressed in suits. They were 
among the first schools to use only foreign teachers and they promised very small class sizes.  
Foreign teachers are scarce, expensive, and of unknown quality. These new schools needed to 
find a way to make the venture profitable. Their solution was an internal computer-based 
curriculum that students need to complete to earn time with the foreign teacher—for every ten 
hours of online study students interact with the foreign instructor for an hour. However, 
advertised promises were frequently not meant or complaints of poor quality also were not 
acknowledge. A prototypical consumer experience as student is told by a student a Wall Street: 
[They] promised foreign teachers… I’ve studied for two units and so far the amount of
 classes provided with foreign teachers are quite limited. Besides, reservation for those =
 limited classes is extremely difficult, let alone catering to my schedule. What’s more
 annoying is that all the teacher taught were grammar and simple sentences, as well as =
 making us listen to tapes repeatedly.… I Feel I have been tricked and cheated, I applied to
 drop out school and returning the rest of my money, but Wall Street English brutally
 refused (Wang 2009).  
Many students repeatedly were cheated and tricked by advertised promises (Chen 2012).  
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If a school appeared profitable bring schools other schools would open copying the 
business model and marketing for instance: “the New Oriental ISAY program in Wuhan is a 
complete copy from New Dynamic, Web, E-bar and EF” (Zhang 2012). Web developed a similar 
computer-based curriculum copying Wall Street but with a more ‘Silicon Valley’ culture. Teachers 
are younger and dress more casually, like the image of Steve Jobs, but the company operates in 
the same fashion as Wall Street. Through heavy marketing as an upscale alternative, they are 
able to charge high prices. Wall Street charges 10,000 RBM per class, in comparison this is 
equivalent to a year at university, and for perspective it would take a Chinese family living on the 
poverty line more than 60 years of per capita income to pay for four years of college (Chen 2012). 
This pricing/brand strategy became more lucrative as class sizes decreased and the supply of 
native English instructors increased.  However, the promise of foreign teachers, and having actual 
instruction by them was frequently broken. As highlighted by Ming Li “there is no way to have so 
many well-known teachers if you don’t use advertising tricks.  To tell you the truth, we have no 
highly qualified teachers, just several ordinary foreigners with nice suits who had their photos 
taken and framed on a big advertising board then placed in a busy street to attract attention and 
gain trust” (Li 2012).   These two players survived the inevitable winnowing that occurs when a 
new industry matures.   
Accompanying Niche Markets  
As the English-language industry developed and grew, niches formed. Schools started to 
cater to business English, English for academic purposes, and/or other specialized courses, such 
as teaching English in hospitality trades or to medical workers. As the Olympics came to Beijing 
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there were programs developed to teach English to taxi drivers and polite conversation to the 
hordes of volunteers. If there was a perceived need, programs and new ventures developed.     
  As English Fever continued, the first generation of adults who had gone through the new 
education system demanded English education at an earlier age for their children. To meet this 
need, English-focused nursery schools and kindergartens mushroomed. Since there were no 
public schools in this niche, private kindergartens started first. Many focused on English 
education and Western pedagogy, thereby continuing the tradition of wanting foreign teacher 
involvement. Qualified Chinese instructors taught the majority of the English curriculum while 
foreign teachers taught only specialized lessons a few times each week. Parents were willing to 
pay more for contact with foreign teachers; higher-priced schools contracted full time foreign 
teachers to meet the demand. Saturday classes also developed with foreign teachers to satisfy 
parents who could not afford the Monday through Friday foreign-instructor-only classes. 
Kindergartens and primary afterschool private language schools often were one venture so 
students could take classes at the same location for years.    
Pre-schools entered the market next. Many were extensions of the kindergartens linked 
to public schools while some were independent and located in shopping malls for convenience 
to parents. These schools offered babysitting services combined with English classes. In 2008, 
Disney entered China’s English education market targeting students aged two to twelve. Disney 
marketing research revealed that for Chinese parents ‘education means everything’ (and) 
…English is viewed as a ticket to the wider world” (The Economist 2010). These centers provide 
contact with foreigners as well as Disney culture. Not only are the students connected to a 
lifelong study of English, but also consumerism as DVDs, stuffed toys and all sorts of Disney 
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products are available. The expansion of private English education reaches consumers at all 
stages and aspects of their lives.  
Weaknesses in Private Education  
 There is essentially no regulation of the private education sector. Schools are able to 
promise anything and are not held accountable (Kwong, 1997). Dissatisfied students have no 
government agency to receive their complaints. Although students will complain online, the 
marketing campaigns of the schools often drown out their voices.   
  Schools are able to lie about teachers’ qualifications with impunity (Edkins 2012). Foreign 
teachers are a valuable commodity and a visible resource that schools use for advertising. 
According to one of the co-authors, who spent nine years in China’s education sector, schools 
tout the teaching credentials of their instructors, yet few of the foreigners really have teaching 
experience. Many are young people seeking adventures, having recently graduated from school 
themselves or bouncing from one job to the next without even a degree in their home country. 
For instance, truck drivers with a high school diploma were marketed as college professors with 
years of English-language teaching under their belts. Sometimes this occurs without the foreigner 
even being aware of the deception. Deception is prevalent in other ways. Curriculum and 
language resources were marketed as being developed in the West when they were either 
internal materials cobbled from a variety of sources or just a Chinese textbook reformatted as 
the school’s own resource. Often, China’s own copyright laws were violated in sourcing these 
documents. Students were promised a small class size only to see class’s double during the 
semester as new students were added. Often the school made conditions bad for the students 
who already paid just so they would leave the program and open up seats for new students. 
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Schools just vanished when the leases ran out, taking all the tuition and even the staff’s pay with 
them.   
 The schools’ ability to do this is exacerbated by a customer base that has little 
understanding of what they really want and “those who don’t understand are easily cheated and 
tricked by all sorts of advertisements” (Zhang 2012). They found foreign teachers who were 
unqualified and inept. They relied on promises of new curriculum but did not have the language 
skills to see that the materials were substandard. Parents with limited English skills bought into 
the promises and blamed the students for poor progress. Dissatisfaction is growing but policing 
the system requires resources. This ‘Wild West’ market of English education in China highlights 
that not all types of entrepreneurial activity are correlated with improved wellbeing (Warnecke, 
2013). Students believe so strongly that English is key to their success that they keep trying, facing 
disappointment after disappointment as they continue to be bamboozled in new ways.  
It seems as if the schools are always one step ahead of the students.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
  Private English schools exemplify the development of an industry without at least 
several key institutional supports: effective regulation, enforcement of contracts between 
students and schools, and the norm of social trust.  For this last institution, we offer some 
evidence from the World Values Survey (WVS) on Table 1.  China was not included in the initial 
wave from 1981-1984 but did participate in the five subsequent waves.    
Table 1: Changes in Trust over Time in the People’s Republic of China  
Wave  Time  TrustYes  
2  1989-1993  59.40%  
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3  1994-1998  50.40%  
4  1999-2004  52.50%  
5  2005-2009  48.67%  
6  2010-2014  61.52%  
    
  The TrustYes variable is a categorical variable familiar in the social trust literature (cf. 
Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, and Zingales 2013) where the question, “Do you think most people can 
be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful” (WVS 2014) is posed to survey respondents; 
TrustYes is the percentage affirming that most people can be trusted.  One notes that for the 
duration of the development of private English schools in China examined here (1987-2010), 
the level of social trust in China diminishes steadily, though it does rebound in the sixth wave 
(2010-2014).  This trend is suggestive though hardly conclusive of the erosion of a key informal  
institution; a thorough empirical investigation is needed.  
  There is more circumstantial evidence.  The development of the private English industry 
in the PRC is most pronounced in the cities, which by nature is more impersonal than country 
living.  The combination of steady urbanization as well as the emphasis on material well-being 
exemplified by slogans such as “It is glorious to get rich” may be undermining social trust.  Table 
2 contains some data about which values are most important to people, again from the WVS.  
Table 2: Changes in Values over Time in the People’s Republic of China  
Wave  Time  Maintain 
order  
Give people 





No answer  
2  1989-1993  66.20%  14.00%  16.70%  2.60%  0.50%  
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3  1994-1998  69.20%  5.87%  22.00%  0.00%  2.93%  
4  1999-2004  49.70%  10.10%  23.10%  4.40%  12.70%  
5  2005-2009  34.76%  11.00%  26.02%  3.82%  24.40%  
6  2010-2014  27.91%  9.48%  50.22%  2.61%  9.78%  
  
  The percentages sum to 100%, so larger percentages indicate that a given value is 
relatively more important than the others.  Among the choices offered, the first “Maintain 
order in the country”, may be characterized as more collectivist in nature, while “Give people 
more say”, “Fight rising prices (inflation)”, and “Protect freedom of speech” are oriented 
towards individual concerns.  The PRC, relative to most countries, is still collectivist in outlook, 
but there has been a shift since the opening to the outside world.  The assent for maintaining 
order has declined precipitously from 66.20% to 27.91% over the five waves, while the 
importance of fighting inflation and thereby protecting people’s assets has increased sharply 
over the same time period.  This shift in values does not itself constitute an institutional void; 
however, the increased concern with one’s financial status could give rise to a void of trust.  We 
remark again that this is plausible, but not proven.  Also noteworthy is that economic stability 
eclipses the two values associated with political freedoms/impact.  
  Our purpose is to advance the notion of a compound void as a concept, and to 
demonstrate its connection with unproductive entrepreneurship.  While institutional voids may 
be troublesome and spur some unproductive entrepreneurship, institutional economic theory 
(North 1990; Baumol 1990) indicates that a given void can be overcome if other available 
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institutions, usually but not exclusively informal institutions, are hardy enough to compensate.  
When the first, formal layer is compromised (lack of regulation, contractual law), a norm such 
as social trust can dissuade bamboozlement.  Both the formal and informal institutions in this 
case guard against horizontal expropriation of rents, and normally reinforce one another.  If 
both fail, then conditions are ripe for unproductive entrepreneurship.  We emphasize that the 
compound void is a local condition with respect to geography and/or industry segment; it is 
different from the pervasive collapse of institutions endemic to failed states.  
  The phenomenon of English Fever in China exemplifies compound voids; studying its 
evolution led to this concept and the accompanying propositions.  China’s English Fever is an 
attempt by the private sector to meet burgeoning demand in English instruction in a rapidly 
changing socio-economic environment.  According to Khanna and Palepu (2010), it is not 
uncommon to witness institutional voids in such contexts.  The fact that formal institutions such 
as regulations and contract law have not kept pace with developments in private English 
education in China is hardly surprising. 
 What is interesting is that the social norm of trust seems to have failed in this instance 
as well.  Trust should be a mitigating factor against the abuses of English Fever; institutional 
theory indicates that norms and laws are mutually reinforcing and that the former can serve as 
a deterrent to predatory or rent-seeking behavior in the absence of the latter, at least to a 
certain extent and for a short duration.  Our study of English Fever reveals widespread 
bamboozlement, and our review of pertinent statistics highlights an ebb in societal trust and 
the collective good.  On the other hand, China’s institutions are basically sound; as evidenced 
by its booming economy over the past three decades.  These factors led us to conceive 
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compound voids as the failure of similar institutions in a localized instance.  Looking at the 
damage wrought by the abuses associated with English Fever, we further theorized that 
unproductive entrepreneurship is the result of these compound voids.   
Precisely because institutions are complex, interlocking meta-systems of rules that 
govern human behavior (North 1990; Hodgson 2006), we contribute to this literature by 
theorizing how the absence of specific institutions impacts economic growth and development.  
While institutional voids are problematic, the real issues occur when mutually reinforcing, 
dyadic institutions such as regulation and social trust give way.  We propose that the effect of 
the compound void is a dramatic increase in rent-seeking behavior as opposed to productive 
entrepreneurship.  While other scholarship, most notably Baumol (1990) traces the effects of 
failing institutions on entrepreneurship and economic development, we offer nuance by 
circumscribing such failure at a local level as opposed to the level of the nation-state.  
  There are limitations to our work.  Conceptually, we have identified the dyad of 
regulation and social trust in our discussion of compound voids; certainly there are others of 
importance.  We have not even attempted the measurement of compound voids or what their 
impact upon unproductive entrepreneurship might be.  These metrics must be developed in 
order to know the scope of the problem and what potential policy solutions might be.  It is our 
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